We often complain that governments never take a long enough view. Not so, say governments. Nonsense, say we.
Back in November 2018, the government set up an Industrial Strategy Council. Under the leadership of Andy Haldane, chief economist at the Bank of England, it was to provide a continuing and impartial evaluation of how the government was delivering its industrial strategy.
In the view of Haldane as he delivered its annual report, ‘The Achilles heel since the war is long-term planning.’ He had a point. The government had abolished the council. It had lasted just over two years. You couldn’t, as they say, make it up.
A legacy, should the government be bothered to read it, is a research paper the council published with its annual report. It examines the lessons that could be learned from the story of the development of the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine.
Impossible made real
It is short and clear and shot through with lessons. The authors, Filip Balawejder, Skye Sampson and Tom Stratton, have done a terrific and succinct job. The story will never cease to amaze. It is, as we all know, an impossibility made into reality.
‘Harness the public, private and voluntary sectors in co-creating and delivering industrial policy’
The secrets are simple and practical, if normally impossibly difficult to achieve, if there is a politician in the room. But instead, this time around, the key was to ‘choose a small number of clear, measurable missions and make them a priority at the highest levels of government’. Then spread the load and collaborate: ‘harness the public, private and voluntary sectors in co-creating and co-delivering industrial policy’.
Power of strategic investment
This is not common. And there was luck in that the foundations for success were that ‘as a result of investment by successive governments’ (an unusual thing in itself), ‘the UK had a comparative advantage in life sciences and especially vaccine research’.
‘It demonstrates’, the paper says, ‘how persistent strategic investment at scale in core strengths generates value for the economy’.
The whole effort was obviously helped by the singularity of purpose resulting from the pandemic. But, from a learning point of view, the paper says ‘it is also important that governments do not rely on crises to catalyse missions and wait until it is too late’.
Long-term view
The science took weeks rather than years, while ‘volunteers’ willingness to take part in the trials played a crucial role in accelerating this phase. But it was the fact that people had been far-sighted and taken a long-term view in the past that meant that ‘a strong foundation in life-sciences and specific expertise in coronavirus vaccines built over many years were the foundations for success’.
‘Targeted public investment over the decade leading up to the pandemic played a role in cultivating expertise in these areas. Longevity’, says the paper, ‘was crucial to compounding the benefits’.
Somewhat out of character, senior government acted responsibly for once. ‘A clear mission, pursued with urgency at the most senior levels in Government, encouraged policy coordination and provided focus for ministers and officials’, says the paper.
Government processes were simplified. Ministerial sign-off was uncharacteristically swift. As the head of the Vaccines Taskforce, Kate Bingham, put it: ‘If I called and said we need to have a decision on this in 24 hours, we had a decision in 24 hours. I think that is unusual’.
The government also stumped up the money, which reduced risk. Ordering 100 million doses in May 2020 was the key. The working capital was there.
Prioritise and collaborate
So what are the lessons? According to the paper, one is: ‘Choose a small number of clear, measurable missions and make them a priority at the highest levels of government’.
Another is: ‘Harness the public, private and voluntary sectors in co-creating and delivering industrial policy’. This is something that hardly ever happens in government projects in normal times.
‘Scientists, venture capitalists, manufacturing experts, regulators, civil servants and volunteers all contributed at different stages of the supply chain’, says the paper. Harnessing all those skills across all those sectors undoubtedly created the success.
You can feel the exhilaration of them all working together – something that is rarely found in government directed projects. Frustration tends to be the norm.
It shows the importance of maintaining key parts of the UK’s infrastructure, in particular its manufacturing base, as a precaution against future crises
Factor in resilience
And, finally, the paper recommends that there is a need to factor resilience into industrial policy, something the Industrial Strategy Council was endeavouring to do. The process revealed gaps in manufacturing capacity at the point when the pandemic struck.
‘This illustrates’, the paper says, ‘the wider importance of “defensively” maintaining key parts of the UK’s infrastructure, and in particular its manufacturing base, as a precaution against future crises’.
This is all wise stuff springing from what will become a terrific case study. But the Industrial Strategy Council is no more. And Bingham has moved back to the private sector as well. In a newspaper interview the other week, she summed it all up.
‘The first thing is to be partners, not adversaries’, she said. ‘And that is very unlike normal government procurement, which is all about how you can get the cheapest price.’
In the venture capital world, Bingham added, ‘There is a partnering mindset that is very different from what’s normal in government’. Or, to put it another way, it is all about having grown-ups in the room.
