The median duration for a failed marriage in England and Wales is 13 years. The statistics for the corporate equivalent – a joint venture (JV) – are noticeably worse. Hard numbers are difficult to locate but the average lifespan is around five to seven years, and many are heavily restructured after the initial incorporation.
I have followed quite a few JVs in my career and there are other parallels with marriage, too. The initial announcements are always super-optimistic, with frequent citing of the 2+2=5 aphorism. Little mention is made of the likely integration turmoil, let alone an exit strategy. There are often onerous ‘pre-nups’, such as put and call options, and dissolution can be both expensive and litigious.
Famous sayings are often ascribed to multiple people, and 2+2=5 is no exception. My favourite example is from George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, when Winston Smith is tortured until he admits that 2+2 can equal whatever the authorities want it to. I am confident that the allegations that his torturer had previously worked in corporate finance are untrue.
All this came to mind because the International Accounting Standards Board is currently deliberating whether to update IAS 28, Investments in Associates and Joint Ventures. I am not going to comment on the exposure draft but focus instead on why JVs are so ephemeral.
Emotional impact
I think there are two main reasons why most JVs fail. The first will be familiar to anyone who has studied acquisitions, either from afar or close up. Acquisition integration is often a form of internal corporate warfare. I have seldom seen an acquisition that didn’t cite cost reduction as a key goal.
I once worked for a Swiss bank that was taken over by another bank. A friend who worked at the acquiring bank asked a senior manager what would happen to the people who worked for the target bank. ‘We’re going to rip their faces off,’ he replied.
It may be impossible to work out whether the targeted positive synergies were achieved
This may be extreme but it illustrates the emotional impact of an integration. Employees worry that they will be given the opportunity to further their careers elsewhere, talented people leave and customer service suffers. The dislocation often results in revenues shrinking in the short term, despite the supposedly compelling logic.
For some reason, investors and analysts talk mainly about positive synergies: lower costs, shared services, better products and services and so on. In my experience, initial synergies are often negative for the reasons described above. By the time that the integration has been completed, it may be impossible to work out whether the targeted positive synergies were achieved, simply because so many other variables will have changed.
Falling short
Academic studies consistently show that most acquisitions fail to achieve their goals, yet they remain very popular. I have no proof, but I suspect that the failure rate for joint ventures is even higher.
My logic is that most JVs do not have a single controlling shareholder but two owners with equal voting power, who may well have diverging aims. This is not an obvious recipe for success.
My other explanation for the short shelf life of a JV is a bit more contentious. I think that most JVs are made from a position of weakness. Their very creation is a tacit admission that both entities are sub-scale. It also implies a lack of better alternatives. Why would you inject a good business into a JV if you were able to grow it or sell it?
There may be other good reasons to set up a JV, such as operating in a country that mandates local partners, but, on balance, Winston Smith should just have said ‘2+2=3, on a good day’.